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Seniority Rules and the Gains from Union Organization
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the optimality of several seniority provisions which
are common to U.S. union contracts. The paper focuses on the attempts by
the initial union members to maximize their return from organizing the
union. An overlapping generations model is used in the analysis. Seniority
wage increases are found to serve as implicit initiation fees and thus
serve as one means of appropriating rents from future union members. Lay-
off rules are shown to be optimal only when the organizers are constrained
in the types of contracts they can write. Without these constraints, the
optimal contract provides full insurance making layoff rules unnecessary.
The paper concludes with a plausible set of constraints which organizers







The focus of recent work on unions has switched from the individual union
worker to the bargaining pair consisting of the union and the firm. The most
prominent feature of the bargaining pair is the explicit contract they
negotiate. A careful analysis of the structure of these contracts should aid
our understanding of unions. Recent work in this area includes research on
COLA provisions (Card, 1983; Ehrenberg, Danziger, and San, 1983) and on
contract length (Dye, 1980; Harris and Holmstrom, 1983).
The aim of this paper is to extend the work in this area in two
dimensions. First, I summarize existing information on the provisions of
major U.S. industrial union contracts (other than COLA clauses and contract
lengths). Secondly, I develop a simple contracting model and discuss the
optimality of these observed contract provisions. The unique aspect of this
model is its emphasis on the initial union organizers rather than the current
union members.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section two presents the
summary of characteristics of U.S. union contracts. A simple contracting
model is developed in section three for an environment of no uncertainty.
Section four adds in demand uncertainty and analyzes the structure of the
optimal contract when the firm is risk neutral.-2—
II. Characteristics of U.S. Union Contracts
In the following sections I will use a contract model to attempt to
explain three general features of U.S. industrial union contracts. These
features are: seniority based wage structures, seniority based layoffs, and
the apparent use of non-price mechanisms to ration union memberships.
Union wage structures are typically written into the contract in the form
of a wage matrix. The rows of the matrix consist of different job categories
or labor grades while the columns consist of steps within a category or grade.
An example taken from the 1915 contract between Martin Marietta Aerospace and
the Autoworkers is provided in Table 1. Movement between the first and last
step occurred automatically every 14 weeks in 5 intervals.
Automatic step-wise movements across the columns of the wage matrix are
quite common. The 1978 survey of major collective bargaining agreements by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) found that "automatic" increases (i.e.
within rate ranges at fixed intervals without reference to merit) appeared in
65 percent of their agreements covering 59.6 percent of workers (Bulletin no.
2065).
Medoff and Abraham (1981, p. 5) provide further evidence on this point
based on a survey they carried out:
virtually none of the very large within-grade or within-job
earnings advantage associated with company service could be explained in
terms of productivity; once employees are assigned to grades or jobs, the
salary advantagethat accrue with company service appears to be automatic
and hence, independent of performance."
Seniorityalso plays an importantrolein movements between job
categories as well. A review by the BLS of approxmately 1,800 major—3-.
contracts in 1971 (Bulletin no. 1425—11) found that seniority was the "sole"
or "primary" determinant of promotions in 37.9 percent of all agreements
covering 23.4 percent of all workers. In manufacturing, the figure was 40.6
percent of all agreements covering 25 percent of all workers. The Bureau of
National Affairs (BNA) investigated this issue in 1983 by surveying a sample
of 400 contracts from their file of major union contracts. They found
seniority to be the "sole" or "determining" factor in promotions in 45 percent
of the total sample and 54 percent of the manufacturing contracts.
Even in contracts where seniority is not the "sole" or "primary"
determinant of promotions, it may still be a significant factor. For example,
the 1968 agreement between Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation and the
Steelworkers (U.S.A.) stipulates that:
"Inallcases of promotion, the following factors will be considered:
(a) length of service, and (b) ability to perform work. Indetermining
factor (b), an employee with longer Continuous service shall not be
compelled to show that he has the highest rating in this factor, it will
be sufficient for him to show that he has an average rating .. ."
Ingeneral, then, industrial union wage structures can be characterized as
favouring wage increases that are strongly tied to seniority. This occurs
both through movements between job steps and promotions among job categories.
A second interesting feature of industrial union contracts is how the
union restricts the manner in which the firm can adjust the total labor input
during a downturn. Contracts often place limitations on work-sharing and
stipulate that layoffs and recalls be based on seniority. Work-sharing refers
to hours restrictions, division of work, and rotation of layoffs.Table 1: Basic Wage Matrix














Source: Martin Marietta Aerospace and the Autoworkers,
1975, Denver.—4-
Work-sharing provisions range from outright prohibitions against any use of
work-sharing to restrictions on the magnitude and duration of its use.
The contract signed in 1973 between the Square 0. Co. and the Electrical
Workers (IBEW) contained the following prohibition:
"If work becomes slack, the company shall not reduce the work-week for
the plant to less than 40 hours, but shall make layoffs with occupational
group and overall seniority ..soas to maintain a 40 hour week and
provide employment to those with the greatest seniority."
An example of restrictions placed on work—sharing is provided in the 1971
contract between the Carrier Corp. and the Sheet Metal Workers:
"For temporary reductions -inproductionnot exceeding 4 weeks in any one
year, the normal work-week for a work group, department, plant or all
plants may be reduced to four 8-hour days without involving a seniority
layoff."
The overall result is that labor input adjustments in unionized firms
occurs primarily through variations in employment rather than average hours.
Medoff (1979) provides a comparison based on May Current Population Survey
micro data for the period, 1973-1975. He found that layoffs were 45 percent
more -important than reductions in average hours for unionized blue collar
workers but that layoffs were 9 percent less important for non-union blue
collar workers.
When layoffs occur, union contracts often specify that they take place
according to seniority. The 1971 review of contracts by the BLS (Bulletin no.
1425-13) found that 25 percent of agreements stated that layoffs must be based
solely on seniority. For example, the 1971 contract between the I/A Market's
Food Handler's Division and the Meat Cutters (MCBW) states:—5.-
"Seniority will apply to layoffs and rehires. The last employee hired
shall be the first laid off, and the last laid off shall be the first
rehired."
Approximately 44 percent of the contracts with layoff provisions assign
seniority a "predominant" role but allow for considerations of other factors
such as ability. The 1971 contract between Crown Cork and Seal Co. and the
Steelworkers (U.S.A.) illustrates this type of provision:
"Seniority shall govern in regard to ... increasesor decreases in
forces, provided that the individual has the ability to perform the job."
The more recent survey by the BNA found that seniority is the "sole" or
"determining" factor in 88 percent of their sample of contracts and 91 percent
of the manufacturing contracts. A common characteristic, then, of industrial
union contracts is that they encourage layoffs over work-sharing and the
layoffs that occur are tied to seniority.
The final characteristic that I would like to discuss is the apparent
absence of rationing of scarce union jobs by a pricing scheme. Becker (1959)
noted that the ability of unions to generate rents for their members will
create an excess supply of workers for union jobs. This excess supply must be
rationed by either price or non-price mechanisms. Becker argued that it would
appear to be in the interest of the current union members to use a price
mechanism such as initiation fees. However, the typical union initiation fee
is very small in comparison to the present value of the estimated wage
differentials (see Becker, 1959; Taft, 1946). This has led researchers to
examine non-price rationing schemes such as discrimination and queuing (see-6-
Becker, 1959; Abowd and Farber, 1982).
In the remaining sections of the paper, I will describe the optimal
contract for the union organizers to write.I will demonstrate how it may
contain the seniority characteristics discussed in this section. In addition,
I will point out how this contract uses a price mechanism other than
initiation fees to ration union jobs.
III. Certainty Case
My aim is to investigate the impact of unionization per Se. For this
reason, I start from a set of simplifying assumptions which imply that
seniority should be irrelevant in the non-union sector.I then analyze what
forms of seniority will be optimal for the organizers of the union to include
in their first contract. This pinpoints which forms of seniority arise
explicitly within a union setting.
Assume that production takes place with an equal number of young and old
workers. Each type of worker has the same productivity and value of leisure.
There are no fixed hiring costs, no training opportunities, and no problems
detecting shirking. Non-union firm pay a constant wage, WA to young and old
workers. In addition, each worker has the same time separable utility
function with identical discount rates. Young workers may save but they can
not borrow against future earnings. The only distinction between workers is
their remaining number of working periods.
By organizing a union, the workers are given the right to collectively—7-
bargain with the firm. As part of this bargaining process, they may jointly
withhold their labor input through calling a strike. It is useful to think of
this bargaining process as involving two distinct components. The first
Consists of an external bargaining between the union as a whole and the firm
over a share of the rents accruing to the bargaining pair. This bargaining
over rents may involve a strike and the ultimate sharing will depend on
reiativ bargaining strengths of the two sides (see Tracy, 1984). This phase
of the bargaining process is not explicitly modelled in this paper.
Given the outcome of this rent sharing, a second phase of internal
bargaining commences over the distribution of the union's share of the rents
among its members. The analysis begins at this stage of the bargaining. The
first case I consider is where the union organizers can commit the union to a
long-term contract covering the entire future of the union.
The objective of the initial union members is to structure this explicit
long—term contract so as to maximize their return from establishing the union.
Two conditions imposed from outside the model as well as two conditions
generated from within the model constrain the options open to the organizers.
I explicitly prohibit the union from being able to borrow against its future
flow of rents. That is, the union can only realize its return by collecting
period by period its share of rents in the form of wages. Secondly, union
members are assumed not to have property rights in the union. This implies
that a member's union card has no asset value and consequently can not be sold
when he leaves the union.' Finally, the two internal constraints on the-8-
organizers are that they cannot write a contract which violates in any period
the initial rent—sharing agreement with the firm. In addition, the contract
terms must be structured so that the union can attract new members and retain
old members in each subsequent period.2
To summarize, initial union members incur some cost in order to organize
a union. In return for this investment, these workers gain two things. The
first is that the firm pays the union a share of the rents accruing to the
bargaining pair each period. Secondly, these workers are given the right to
draw up an explicit long-term contract and to commit the union to that
contract. The case where the contract is open to renegotiation in each period
will be discussed later on in this section. Throughout the analysis, the
demand conditions (both present and future) facing the firm are assumed to be
known with certainty by both the firm and the union.
In order to explicitly describe the organizer's decision problem, define
the following:
=Wagepaid to young union workers in period t
=Wagepaid to old union workers in period t
WA =Wagepaid to non-union workers
K =Firm'sshare of total rents
N =Numberof workers in the union which is equally
divided among young and old members.
R(N) =Totalrevenues net of non-labor costs
With no uncertainty, contracts simply stipulate the wage to be paid to young
and old workers in each period. Denote a particular long—term contract by-9-
w = whereW =(wt,wt).
There is no consensus in the literature on the appropriate objective
function for a union. For simplicity, assume that the organizer's objective
function is given by the weighted average of the utility of a young and an old
organizer. The specific weight used, A, is determined by the relative
bargaining strengths of the young and old organizers. The decision problem
for the organizers during this second phase of bargaining can be written as:
(1) MAX A [U(w1) +(1p)U(w02)] +(1—A)U(w01)
Subject to
(2) (it): U(wt) +(1+p)U(w0t+1)UU(wA)Ii+(1)'
,tt
(3) (nt): w0 WA; #t
(4) R(N) -[w+ w] K; #t
The multipliers for each constraint are indicated in parentheses. The
implied first-order conditions are listed below.
(5) W1: U'(W1)(A+i1) =
(6) W01: U'(w01)(1—A) =Ti1
-




(9) Wt: U(wt)Y =t? 3
(10) w0t: (1+p) U(w0tbfti =t
-t 3
The structure of the optimal long-term contract is summarized in the
following two propositions.
Proposition 1:
The optimal contract distributes all of the union's period by period
share of rents to its members. In addition, only the initial organizers
benefit from the union.
Demonstration
Given that X > 0, equation (5) implies that > 0. Similarly,
with X > 0, equation (8) implies that 712 > 0. Since 112 > 0, equation (7)
implies y2 > 0. Setting t = 3 in equation (10), 2 > 0 implies that 713
> 0. Finally setting t = 3 in equation (9), 713 > 0 implies that 13 > 0.
Repeated use of equations (9) and (10) shows that > 0 and '>0 for
t3. Combining this result with the earlier results give us that n.t > 0
Vt while > 0 for t2. The rent constraint is binding f or each period
while the lifetime utility constraint is binding for all new members who
join the union in periods following its establishment.
If the union organizers could charge entry fees and if no capital market
imperfections existed, then it would not be surprising to find that—11—
proposition one holds. That is, despite the fact that the firm pays the union
a share of rents in each period of the contract only the organizers benefit
from being in the union. The entry fee would be set equal to the discounted
value of this flow of rents. This would allow the organizers to fully
appropriate all future rents. What makes proposition one interesting is that
it holds even when the organizers can't use explicit entry fees. Given this
constraint, the organizers adopt a second-best method of price rationing. The
nature of this alternative scheme for appropriating future rents is given in
proposition two.
Proposition 2:
The optimal contract involves seniority based wage increases. That
is, the union wage profile is steeper than the non-union profile for all
members who join the union after -it is established.
Demonstration
Assume for simplicity that the magnitude of X is such that both
young and old organizers benefit from setting up the union, i.e.













(12) R(N) =(w*1÷w*1) = K
(ii)(w,w):
(13) {W: U(W) +(•i÷p)U (W) = U, R(N) - (w+w)=K}
(14) w* =MAX w 0 0
w*cw
$
The opt-imality ofis clear since it exhausts the total rents
available to the organizers in the first period and divides these rents
in the appropriate manner given the relative bargaining strengths. To
show that W* = 1t=2optimal, we must demonstrate two things.
First we must show that W dominates all other feasible stationary
contracts. Secondly, we must show that no non-stationary contract can
be optimal.
Consider any stationary contract from period two onwards:
W = where= (w,w) ; t2. Proposition one demonstrated
that a binding rent and life—time utility constraint are necessary
conditions for an optimal contract. Given a stationary contract, this









Consequently, for a stationary contract W to be optimal, WeW5. Which
stationary contract out of the set W will the organizers prefer? The
only wage term in these contracts that enters the organizer's objective
function is we,. This wage is collected by the young organizers during
their second period in the union. This implies that the organizers will
choose the stationary contract from W which has the largest value for
w0. This is summarized in equation (14).
We will now demonstrate that there is no non-stationary
contract that can dominate W* and satisfy the two necessary conditions
from proposition one. Consider any non-stationary contract (w)2.
In order to dominate W*, the non-stationary contract must set w2 >w.
Again this follows from the fact that w02 is the only contract term in
{w)2 which enters the organizer's objective function. If w02 >
thenin order for W2 to satisfy the second period rent constraint, w2 <
w.
The contract {w}'2 must also be able to attract young workers in the
second period. Since w,2 <w
this implies that w03 >w.The magnitude
of wis illustrated in Diagram One.
03
The optimal stationary contract sets W equal to Point A in the
diagram. Suppose that by increasing w02 >w
the non-stationary contract
sets w2 equal to Point B. To satisfy the lifetime utility constraint for
new members in the second-period, wages paid to these new members when—14-
they are old must be equal to the level indicated by Point C. Given that
the non-stationary contract must also satisfy the rent constraint in
period three, W3 is set to equal to Point D. Continuing with the
argument indicates that the non—stationary contract must raise wO, and
lower each period from their previous levels in such a way
as to move up along the rent constraint. This strategy can not be
continued indefinitely given the upper bound of[R(N)-K] for w0
and the lower bound of zero for Thus, no non—stationary contract
can dominate W* and simultaneously satisfy the rent and lifetime utility
constraints in each period. The optimal contract, then, is stationary
from period two onwards. The proposition is demonstrated by noting that
W <w<p4*
y A o
When commitment is possible, the union organizers find it optimal to
write seniority-based wage increases into the contract starting in the second
period. Tilting the wage profile in this manner transfers income from new
union members to the organizers. However, this form of price rationing
creates an inefficiency in the intertemporal consumption pattern of new
members. This inefficiency limits the magnitude of the wage tilt. In
addition, this explains why new union members are indifferent between joining
the union or not despite the fact that the firm is continuing to share the
rents in each period.





















Consider the impact of a reduction in the union's flow of rents. This shifts
the bargaining constraint inward. Following the argument above, the optimal
stationary contract moves from Point A in the diagram to a point southeast
along the indifference curve U. This implies that the wage/tenure profile
will be flatter than before. If empirical measures for the total rents
available to a bargaining pair and for the union's relative bargaining power
were available, then the model predicts that these two variables would
interact positively with tenure in a union wage regression.
The remaining aspect of the certainty case to discuss is the structure of
union contracts when the union can not commit itself to future contract
provisions. In this case, the contract can be changed each period. While it
seems natural to assume that current young union members are uncertain about
their future relative bargaining strength, I limit myself to the case
where the sequence of bargaining strengths is known in advance. Let this
sequence be denoted by h ={X}'1.
The optimal contract conditional on h
that is signed in period t is given by W IAand consists only of a young and
old wage for that period.





(18) (it): U(w) +(1+p)U(wt+i)-16-
(19) w0.
(20) (flt): R(N) - + w0]K
where w1eW1
The two first-order conditions are listed below.
(21) Wyc (A+U(wt)
=
(22) W0t:(1—At) U(w0t) =
Ratherthan discuss the general structure of these contracts, I will
focus on two special cases involving specific A sequences. The first case is
Where the only young workers to have any bargaining power are those that help
organize the union. That is, A =0for t2.
Proposition 3:
The optimal long-term contract with commitment is identical to the
sequence of one-period contracts where no commitment is possible but
for t2.
Demonst rat ion
Substituting for At in equation (22) we get that 1J(w0t) =
SinceU(wt)>O and this implies that >0. That is, the rent
sharing constraint is binding for t2. Now substitute into equation
(21) to get that )'tU(wt)= Since U(Wyt)>O and i>O, this implies—17—
that The lifetime utility constraint is also binding for t)2.
These two constraints plus the feasibility constraint for older workers
define a stationary sequence of one-period contracts identical to the
long-term contract discussed in proposition two.
The optimal long-term contract can be supported even though commitment to
future contract terms is impossible if for t2. How might we rationalize
this particular sequence of relative bargaining strengths? Suppose that all
proposed changes in the contract terms must be voted on by the current union
members. Given the simple age structure and preferences of the union members,
there are only three possible voting outcomes: unanimous opposition,
unanimous support, or a split vote along age lines. The sequence fort2
would result if all ties were broken in favor of the old union members.
Instead of commiting the union to a long—term contract, the union organizers
only need to commit the union to this voting rule. This may be possible
through adopting a union constitution which embodies this rule and which
requires more than a majority vote to amend.
The second case to consider is where the relative bargaining strength of
young workers is constant through time. That is, =A>0for all t.
Proposition 4:
When At =Afor all t, union organizers can use seniority-based wage
increases to extract rents from future members only when older union
workers have relatively more bargaining strength, i.e. A <1/2.-18-
Demonstration:
Assume that both old and young union organizers earn some rents from
the union. This implies that A >0and == 0.The first-period
wages, then, satisfy the following two conditions:







These wages define a stationary contract which satisfies the first-order
conditions for each subsequent period. When A <1/2,w1 <w1.
To summarize, if the union organizers can commit the union to a long-term
contract, then they will structure the contract so that wages increase with
seniority. Making the wage profile steeper than the productivity profile
allows the organizers to appropriate some of the rents that the firm pays out
to future union members. Seniority-based wage increases act as a substitute
for initiation fees.4 Commitment t a long-term contract is not necessary so
long as the organizers can commit the union to a voting rule which sets At =0
for t2. When the organizers can not commit the union either to a long-term
contract or to the appropriate voting rule, then their ability to appropriate
future rents is limited by the relative bargaining strength of future union
members.
One final point to note in the certainty case concerns the impact of the
political nature of unions on the contracts they write. A union contract can—19-
not go into effect until it is "ratified" by the union membership.
Differences between union and non-union practices have been viewed as arising
from differences in preferences between a "median" union voter and a
"marginal" non-union worker. Freeman (1976) explains:
"If as a first approximation the median voter model is applied
to union behavior, trade union policy will be set by the median
member (who is the marginal voter) ... tradeunionism transforms
the supply side of the job market by making median (or some other
average) rather than marginal preferences the 'determinant' of the
labor contract." (author's emphasis.)
This model offers two cases where this distinction does not apply. If
the organizers can commit the union to a long-term contract or if no
commitment is possible but At =0for t2, then the optimal contract is given
by point A in diagram one. Given the bargaining constraint, the s"tructure of
this stationary contract is determined entirely by the preferences of the
"marginal" worker deciding whether to join the union or not. So long as the
constraint on hiring new union members is binding (i.e. new union members do
not earn rents), "marginal" rather than "median" preferences will play a key
role in shaping the form of the contract.
IV. Uncertainty Case
In this section the optimality of different layoff "rules" is examined
when the firm faces demand shocks in each period. In order to generate
layoffs in the model, a very simple form of uncertainty is used. In each
period, the firm is in either a "high" or "low" state of demand. The
probability of a high demand state occurring in any period is P and is-20-
independent of previous demand conditions. In low demand states, I assume
that it is efficient for the firm and the union to lay off a fraction e of the
union workers where 0 <e<1/2.That is, it is possible to concentrate all
layoffs in one cohort of workers. If a worker is laid off, then he either
finds a part-time job paying WA or receives b in terms of leisure and state
unemployment benefits. There are no search costs and the probability of
finding a part-time job is given by 6.1 assume that b and 6 are the same for
young and old union workers in order to minimize the need for layoff rules in
the non-union sector.
Throughout this section, I assume either that the union organizers can
commit the union to a long-term contract or to the appropriate voting rule
supporting a long-term contract. The first point that I would like to
establish is that the union organizers incorporate layoff rules into the
contract only as a means of overcoming restrictions on the types of
compensation they can write into the contract. This observation is
illustrated through the following two propositions.
Proposition 5:
If the organizers are prohibited from paying y wages to laid
off workers, then so long as the probability of finding a part—time
job is not too high, the organizers adopt a seniority layoff rule.
Demonstration:
Let index the layoff rule in the tth period. As ranges from
zero to one, layoffs occur by strict inverse seniority to strict—21—
seniority. Intermediate values a correspond to randomized layoff
rules. Contracts Consist of four wage terms for each period plus
the layoff rule, = Superscripte denotes
a wage paid to an employed worker in the bad state. The organizer's
decision problem can be summarized as follows.5
MAX A EU1 +(1-A)EU1
S.T. EU? EU ; yt yA
EU0t ? EUOA; v' (lit)
Eir
where




















The first-order conditions for W, t >2imply that the organizers
equalize employment wages for each cohort across states of nature. That
is, w=wCand w=e Consider now the choice of layoff rules.
yt yt ot ot







The optimal layoff rule depends on the difference G(wt) -G(we).
Differentiating,
G(w) = <0if IJ(w) -EUU>
Giventhat the organizers want to tilt the wage profile in order to
appropriate rents, w < < Clearly, U(we) >EIJ'.If 8 is
lsmallu and b <w,
then U(w) >EU.In this case, as pointed out
by Holmstrom (1983), it is too expensive ex ante to lay off the older
workers who receive higher wages. The organizers adopt a strict
seniority layoff rule, i.e. =1.The difference between this result
and Holmstrom's is in the motivation for the tilted wage profile.
Now consider how the optimal contract changes when the organizers face no
restrictions on the types of compensation they can use in the contract. In
particular, the contract can pay unemployment wages to young and old workers,
these wages can be conditioned on whether the laid off worker finds a
part-time job, and these wages can be negative for young workers so long as
they still have an incentive to remain in the union.-23-
Proposition 6:
If the union organizers can structure unemployment wages as outlined
above, then they are indifferent to the manner in which the firm
initiates the layoffs.
Demonstration
Add a second superscript to index whether a laid off worker finds
a part-time job or not. This creates eight wages for each period, i.e.
= i =y,o.The decision problem for the























The first-order conditions for W imply that it is optimal for the
organizers to structure the contract so that each cohort of workers is
fully insured across all demand and employment states.
== w+w




ot ot A ot ot
Substituting in for these insurance results causes to drop out of both
the objective function and each of the constraints. Consequently, the-24—
organizers are Indifferent to the layoff rules used.
The need for layoff rules, then, arises from restrictions on the set of
feasible contracts available to the organizers. The results of proposition
five provide a reasonable explanation for union seniority layoff rules only to
the extent that the restrictions placed on the contracting environment also
seem reasonable. Previous work on implicit contracts (see: Akerlof and
Miyazaki (1980) and Rosen (1983)) has pointed out that there is little
theoretical justification for a priori prohibitions against payments made to
laid off workers by their firms. In addition, these payments are actually
written into U.S. union contracts. A survey by the BLS (Bulletin no. 2065)
found that 25 percent of manufacturing contracts examined provided
"supplemental unemployment" benefits. These contracts covered 53 percent of
unionized manufacturing workers. In addition, Feeman and Medoff (1984) found
that unionized firms have a 5 percent higher probability of offering
supplemental unemployment insurance benefits and an 81 percent higher
expenditure on these benefits.
In light of this evidence, it is important to examine the use of layoff
rules in a setting where the union organizers are given more latitude than
allowed in proposition five. Specifically, I allow the contract to specify
wages to unemployed workers. These wages can vary depending on the workers
age cohort. However, the bargaining pair can not verify whether or not a laid
offworker secures a part-time job. This implies thatunemployment wages can-25-
not be indexed to the worker's subsequent employment status. This provides an
intermediate case to those discussed in propositions five and six.
Proposition 7:
Given the set of feasible contracts described above, the specific
layoff rule which is optimal for the organizers to write into the
contract depends on their attitudes toward risk. The optimal rule is
given by
Seniority layoffs increasing
Indifferent to rule If U(w) displays constant Absolute Risk-Aversion
Inverse seniority layoffs decreasing (ARA)
Demonstration






























Sinceb and oarethe same for young and old workers, EUt =EUtwhen
=e •Thisallows us to define the general function
yt ot
U(We)_EUu(We)
G(w) - Wu(We) - ____________
- e U (w
Using this function, equation (26) simplifies to





U(w) dw U(w) U(w)
Optinal choice of wU implies from equations (25) that the first term
equals zero. Thus,
eu e
[U(w )-EU(w )]_______ (w) =
-e U (w
—26—
First-orderconditions for imply that for t >2
(25) U(w) =EUt




tmai, Geanakoplos, and Ito (1981) derive a condition that determines the
e Ue
sign of U(w )-EU (w )given that equations (25) hold.—27--
> decreasing
u(We) -EUU(Ne)—astJ(w) displaysconstant ARA
(decreasing





—0as U(w) displays <constant ARA
t ' ( decreasing
Seniority layoff rules may be part of an optimal explicit contract even
when limited forms of supplemental unemployment benefits are allowed.
However, even this restriction on the set of feasible contracts may also be too
strong. The basic assumption used is that the state can verify the worker's
subsequent employment status while the union (or firm) can not. This
informational asymmetry may not exist in practice. For example, the SUB plan
adopted for Ford Motor Company and the UAW in the early sixties deducted any
outside earnings over $10 per week from the total benefit. (See: BLS
Bulletin no. 1425-2).
Two final issues are worth discussing. The first concerns the
"enforceability" of the contract. This issue has been raised by several
authors recently (see for example Bull, 1983). The fact that union workers
can not be forced to fulfill a particular contract has been allowed for by the
inclusion of the to utility constraints. However, there still remains the
issue of what prevents the firm from firing older workers who are being paid-28-
wages in excess of their productivity. The standard argument is that
"reputation" effects are strong enough to rule out this type of behavior (see:
Holmstrom, 1981, 1983). In the context of union contracts, collective action
by the union may provide a stron9er deterrent than reputation effects.
Formalized union grievance procedures may be interpreted as a type of
enforcement mechanism. This illustrates another example of the "Exit vs.
Voice" distinction between non-union and union labor markets (see: Hirscham,
1970).
Finally, I would like to address a potential criticism of the model. A
central feature of the model is the desire by the union organizers to increase
the tilt of the union wage/tenure profile as a means of appropriating rents
from future members. However, most empirical studies (see: Block & Kuskin,
1978; and Duncan & Leigh, 1980, 1985) find that union wage/tenure profiles are
flatter than non-union profiles. These findings may still be consistent with
the model's predictions. It is important to interpret the wage rate in the
model as the total compensation for a period. The above studies ignore
non—wage components of the compensation package. Freeman and Medoff (1984)
find that for a union and non-union job paying the same wage, fringe benefits
are approximately 30 percent higher for the union job. In addition, they find
that unions alter the composition of the fringe benefits in a way that benefits
older workers. They conclude:
"We find that, while wages do not rise as rapidly with age or
seniority for union workers as for non-union workers, nonwage
benefits rise more rapidly with age under unionism, and by more than
enough to offset the slower increase in wages with age." (p. 131)—29--
Total compensation/tenure profiles may in fact be steeper for unions as
suggested by this model. However, a remaining criticism is that Freeman and
Medoff's evidence also indicates that both young and old union workers receive
higher levels of total compensation than their nonunion counterparts. This
does not substantiate the model's prediction that young union members should
not earn rents from being in the union.Footnotes
1. This is in contrast to the taxi cab market where medallions do have asset
value. See Martin (1980) for a discussion of these property right issues.
2. There may arise circumstances in which the union is both willing and able
to drive the firm out of business by bargaining for more than the total amount
of the rents.I restrict my attention to cases in which the firm has
sufficient bargaining power to insure itself a share of the rents into the
indefinite future. This implies that it is always important that the union is
able to attract new members.
3. An alternative may to see that point A in the diagram is the optimal
stationary contract is to notice that the other possible stationarycontract
is not feasible since it sets w <WA.In addition, it is important to note
that A only affects the distribution of the union's first-period rents among
the young and old organizers. The shape of the wage/tenure profile from
period two on is independent of A.
4.An additional rationale for unions to tilt their wage profile exists in
states with right-to-work laws. These laws allow workers to choose to be
covered by a union contract without joining the union. A free-rider problem is
created since initiation fees can be collected only from those workers who join
the union. This can in part be circumvented if unions implicitly collect the
initation fee through a tilted wage profile.
5. Implicitly I've assumed that workers accumulate seniority while on
layoff. In a survey of contracts, the BLS (Bulletin no. 1425-14) found
considerable variation in the actual treatment of seniority on layoff. Manycontracts allow workers to collect seniority for the entire layoff period
regardless of its length. Some contracts specify a maximum possible layoff
period for which seniority accumulates. An example of this is given by the
contract signed between Dunlop Tire and Rubber Company and the United Rubber
Workers in June 1973:
"A laid off employee subject to recall with 2 years' or more of
seniority when laid off shall be carried on the seniority list
indefinitely. If rehired, he shall receive credit for seniority
held at time of lay—off, plus seniority credit for time laid off not
to exceed 2 years."
The BLS, though, also found examples of contracts in which no seniority was
collected on layoff.
6. I've assumed here that the firm pays for unemployment wages out of
current revenues. This type of "unfunded" plan is actually not used much in
practice. Out of a total of 174 supplemental unemployment benefit (SUB) plans
examined by the BLS in the early sixties, only three were unfunded. The
common practice is for a single employer or group of employers to pay each
period a fixed amount per employee into a fund. All SUB payments are paid out
of this fund. This type of financing was used in 160 out of the 174 plans
examined. So long as you require that the firm's per period contributions
equal its expected SUB payments, then the results carry through. A third type
of financing is an individual worker account. According to this method, the
firm keeps track of all credits and payments made for each employee. Unlike
the funded plans, these accounts are vested in that employees can take any
surplus in their account (up to some maximum amount) with them when they leave
the firm. This third form of financing was found in 11 of the 174 plans (see:
BLS Bulleting no. 1425—2).
7. For a more detailed discussion of this point see Kuhn (1982).References
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